ENDING THE DEATH PENALTY FOR PEOPLE WITH SEVERE MENTAL
ILLNESS
(HOW RECENT SUPREME COURT CASES INTERPRETING ATKINS V.
VIRGINIA SUPPORT A NEW DEATH PENALTY PROHIBITION)

Josh Salzer
I. INTRODUCTION
People with severe mental illness1 continue to be executed in the United
States.2 Though there are constitutional prohibitions against executing
“insane” defendants,3 many people with severe mental illness are not
considered to be “insane” and are still executed.4 Defendants with severe
mental illness facing the death penalty often argue that the impairment from
their illness should make them constitutionally ineligible for execution. 5 These
defendants argue that their impairment is sufficiently similar to people with

1

2

3

4

5

Some sources prefer to use the term “severe mental disorder or disability.” I mean the term “severe
mental illness” to cover the same conditions as in American Bar Association Recommendation
Number 122A, adopted by the House of Delegates on August 7–8, 2006.
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/2011_build/death_penalty_moratorium/m
ental_illness_policies.authcheckdam.pdf (2006) at 6–7 [hereinafter ABA Recommendation 122A]
(describing the conditions that would qualify as severe mental disorder or disability, including “Axis
I diagnoses” such as “schizophrenia and other psychotic disorders, mania, major depressive disorder,
and dissociative disorders” and other conditions that cause significant disfunction).
Mentally Ill Prisoners Who Were Executed, DEATH PENALTY INFORMATION CENTER (last visited
Sept. 4, 2019), https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/policy-issues/mental-illness/mentally-ill-prisoners-whowere-executed (listing recent executions of inmates who had mental illness).
See Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 410 (1986) (“The Eighth Amendment prohibits the State
from inflicting the penalty of death upon a prisoner who is insane.”).
See Frank R. Baumgartner and Betsy Neill, Does the death penalty target people who are mentally
ill?
We
checked.,
THE
WASHINGTON
POST
(Apr.
3,
2017)
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2017/04/03/does-the-death-penalty-targetpeople-who-are-mentally-ill-we-checked/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.ba1a7bb202d8 (reporting that
people with severe mental illness are executed despite their disability).
See, e.g., Smith v. Davis, 927 F.3d 313, 339 (5th Cir. 2019) (“Smith asks us to affirm the district
court’s grant of habeas relief on the basis that evolving standards of decency render those with
‘severe mental illness’ ineligible for the death penalty under the Eighth Amendment.”). See also
State v. Kleypas, 382 P.3d 373, 445–46 (Kan. 2016) (surveying cases that have addressed the issue of
whether mental impairment ought to constitutionally bar the death penalty in appeals by death row
defendants).
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intellectual disability,6 whom the Supreme Court held to be constitutionally
ineligible for the death penalty in Atkins v. Virginia.7 Legal commentators and
legal and medical professional organizations have also argued for a new
prohibition against executing people who were significantly impaired by severe
mental illness at the time of their crime. 8 However, no court has accepted this
argument.9
This article argues that courts or legislatures should prohibit the execution
of people with severe mental illness who were significantly impaired by their
illness at the time of their crime in light of recent Supreme Court death penalty
interpretation of Atkins. Defendants who were significantly impaired by severe
mental illness at the time of their crime should not be eligible for the death
penalty because they have sufficiently reduced culpability. 10 This reduced
culpability, as for defendants with intellectual disability in Atkins and juveniles
in Roper v. Simmons,11 cannot be adequately accounted for in sentencing.12 A
new prohibition should therefore be created and operate as a dispositive
mitigating factor against imposing the death penalty.

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002) [hereinafter Atkins] (concluding that “death is not a
suitable punishment for a mentally retarded criminal.”). The Atkins court used the term “mentally
retarded” but the currently-accepted term referring to the same condition is “intellectual disability,”
which I will use throughout this comment. See, e.g., Hall v. Florida, 572 U.S. 701, 704 (2014) (noting
the change in accepted terminology from “mental retardation” to “intellectual disability” as describing
identical phenomena, which is reflected in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorder
(DSM-5)). Major diagnostic systems in the United States define intellectual disability as a
developmental condition that is characterized by significant deficits in both intellectual functioning
and adaptive behavior, including conceptual, social and practical skills. Marc J. Tassé, Defining
intellectual disability: Finally we all agree…almost, AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION
(Sept. 2016, https://www.apa.org/pi/disability/resources/publications/newsletter/2016/09/intellectualdisability).
Atkins, 536 U.S. at 320–21 (holding that executing people with intellectual disability violates the
Eighth Amendment prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment).
See, e.g., Christopher Slobogin, What Atkins Could Mean For People With Mental Illness, 33 N.M.
L. REV. 293 (2003) (advocating for extending Atkins to people with mental illness). See also ABA
Recommendation 122A, at 5 (recommending a prohibition on executing “persons with severe mental
disabilities whose demonstrated impairments of mental and emotional functioning at the time of the
offense would render a death sentence disproportionate to their culpability.”).
Kleypas, 382 P.3d at 445–46. See also Part V infra (listing cases that have considered and rejected
this contention when raised by a death row defendant).
See Part II(B) infra (arguing that people with severe mental illness who were significantly impaired at
the time of their crime have sufficiently reduced culpability to be eligible for a death penalty
exemption).
Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005) (holding that defendants who were juveniles at the time
of their crime had sufficiently reduced culpability to be ineligible for the death penalty under the
Eighth Amendment).
See Part VII(A) infra (arguing that impairment due to severe mental illness cannot be adequately
accounted for in sentencing).
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A new prohibition of this kind faces two significant hurdles that can be
overcome by sensible qualifications informed by Supreme Court decisions
interpreting Atkins. The first hurdle is determining which defendants have
“severe mental illness.”13 This article argues that an appropriate solution would
be to rely on the standards of medical professionals to determine which
defendants have “severe mental illness.” This solution would align with the
Supreme Court’s approach in recent cases interpreting Atkins. Recent
Supreme Court cases interpreting Atkins have relied extensively on the
standards of medical professionals to determine which defendants have
intellectual disability for the purpose of exempting them from the death
penalty.14 A similar reliance on medical professionals for defining “severe
mental illness” would be appropriate in light of these cases.
The second hurdle for a new prohibition is to account for variations in
impairment from severe mental illness that varies the level of reduced
culpability for people with severe mental illness. The variation in impairment
among and within mental illnesses necessitates a more individuated approach
than for people with intellectual disability and juveniles.15 Severe mental illness
is not often as pervasively disabling as intellectual disability or youth. People
with severe mental illness do not all have reduced culpability and those that
do are often not disabled all of the time. A prohibition on executing people
with severe mental illness must account for this distinction by individuating the
approach. This can be accomplished by requiring that that the defendant’s
severe mental illness caused significant impairment at the time of the crime
that sufficiently reduced his or her culpability.16 The requirement would also
resolve many of the objections to category-defining problems, as discussed
further below. The significant impairment requirement, along with a definition
of “severe mental illness” informed by medical professionals, offers a sensible
and workable expansion of death penalty protections. This article works to
justify this approach and examine the current state of the law on the issue.
II. IMPAIRMENTS FROM SEVERE MENTAL ILLNESS CAN SUFFICIENTLY

13

14
15

16

See, e.g., People v. Mendoza, 62 Cal.4th 856, 911 (Cal. 2016) (rejecting defendant’s proposed
exemption from the death penalty due to his mental illness in part because the “defendant [did] not
offer a definition of what level of mental illness would constitute serious mental illness.”).
See, e.g., Moore v. Texas, 137 S. Ct. 1039, 1044 (2017).
See ABA Recommendation 122A, at 7 (explaining that, for people with severe mental illness,
“preclusion of a death sentence based on diagnosis alone would not be sensible, because the
symptoms of these disorders are much more variable than those associated with retardation or other
disabilities covered by the Recommendation’s first paragraph.”).
See id. at 7–9 (explaining how a significant impairment requirement might work).
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REDUCE CULPABILITY TO QUALIFY FOR A DEATH PENALTY EXEMPTION
The Supreme Court in Atkins found that as groups people with intellectual
disability have sufficiently reduced culpability to be categorically ineligible for
the death penalty. The Court focused on cognitive, judgmental, and social
impairments of people in these groups to make this determination. People
with severe mental illness, as defined below, have similar impairments that
sufficiently reduce their culpability as a group that should make them ineligible
for the death penalty.
A. The Reduced Culpability of People With Intellectual Disability
The Supreme Court explained in Atkins the relevant impairments of
people with intellectual disability that reduce their culpability.17 The Court
found that people with intellectual disability are not often so impaired to be
incompetent to stand trial because they “frequently know the difference
between right and wrong.”18 However, because of “their disabilities in areas of
reasoning, judgment, and control of their impulses . . . they do not act with the
level of moral culpability that characterizes the most serious adult criminal
conduct.”19 By definition, people with intellectual disability “have diminished
capacities to understand and process information, to communicate, to abstract
from mistakes and learn from experience, to engage in logical reasoning, to
control impulses, and to understand the reactions of others.”20 These
impairments are relevant not only because they reduce culpability, but because
these impairments “can jeopardize the reliability and fairness of capital
proceedings” against defendants with intellectual disability. 21 The Court noted
that people with intellectual disability “may be less able to give meaningful
assistance to their counsel and are typically poor witnesses, and their
demeanor may create an unwarranted impression of lack of remorse for their
crimes.”22 Due to these impairments, the Supreme Court found that executing
people with intellectual disability violates the Eighth Amendment prohibition
against cruel and unusual punishment.23

17
18
19
20
21
22
23

Atkins, 536 U.S. at 320.
Id. at 318.
Id. at 306.
Id. at 318.
Id. at 306–07.
Id. at 320–21.
Id. at 321.
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B. Severe Mental Illnesses Can Similarly Reduce Culpability
People with significant impairment from severe mental illness at the time
of their crime have sufficiently reduced culpability based on the factors
identified by the Supreme Court in Atkins. The definition of “severe mental
illness” in American Bar Association Recommendation 122A presents a good
functional definition based on agreements by medical and legal professionals.24
The Recommendation was created by a task force of legal and mental health
professionals and was officially endorsed by the American Psychological
Association and American Psychiatric Association among others. 25
Recommendation 122A defines severe as signifying “a disorder that is roughly
equivalent to disorders that mental health professionals would consider the
most serious ‘Axis I diagnoses.’ These disorders include schizophrenia and
other psychotic disorders, mania, major depressive disorder, and dissociative
disorders – with schizophrenia being by far the most common disorder seen
in capital defendants.”26 The Recommendation task force explicitly excluded
Antisocial Personality Disorder and the voluntary use of drugs or alcohol from
eligibility for the exemption because these conditions do not lessen culpability
or deterrability.27 The Recommendation also explains that “[s]ome conditions
that are not considered an Axis I condition might also, on rare occasions,
become ‘severe’ as that word is used in this Recommendation.”28
These conditions sufficiently reduce culpability. The Recommendation
explains that “In their acute state, all of these disorders are typically associated
with delusions (fixed, clearly false beliefs), hallucinations (clearly erroneous
perceptions of reality), extremely disorganized thinking, or very significant
disruption of consciousness, memory and perception of the environment.”29
These impairments negatively impact the ability of people with severe mental
illness in “reasoning, judgment, and control of their impulses,” which the
Supreme Court found to reduce culpability in Atkins.30 Considering the
serious impairments caused by severe mental illness, people with significant
impairment from severe mental illness should be considered to have

24
25
26
27
28

29
30

ABA Recommendation 122A (2006), at 6–7.
Id. at 3.
Id. at 6.
Id. at 9.
Id. at 6–7 (“For instance, some persons whose predominant diagnosis is a personality disorder, which
is an Axis II disorder, may at times experience more significant dysfunction. Thus, people with
borderline personality disorder can experience ‘psychotic-like symptoms . . . during times of stress.’
However, only if these more serious symptoms occur at the time of the capital offense would the
predicate for this Recommendation’s exemption be present.”).
Id. at 6.
Atkins, 536 U.S. 304 at 306.
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sufficiently reduced culpability to be considered for a categorical death penalty
exemption.
III. DEFERENCE TO THE DEFINITIONS OF MEDICAL PROFESSIONAL
ORGANIZATIONS WOULD RESOLVE BASIC CATEGORY PROBLEMS OF A
NEW PROHIBITION
Some courts have refused to create a new death penalty exemption in part
because of concerns about defining a category of mental illness that would be
“severe” or “serious” enough to account for sufficiently reduce culpability.31 A
simple solution would be to rely on the standards of medical professionals to
define “severe mental illness” as in ABA Recommendation 122A.32 This
approach would also be consistent with the approach of the Supreme Court
in recent decisions interpreting Atkins. In Hall v. Florida33 and Moore v.
Texas,34 the Court required states to conform to the clinical definitions of
intellectual disability in applying Atkins.35 Along with the proposed significant
impairment requirement that necessitates an individuated analysis,36 deferring
to medical professionals’ definition of “severe mental illness” would resolve
basic category problems of a new death penalty exemption.
A. Supreme Court Deference to the Definitions of Medical Professionals in
Hall and Moore
In Hall, the Supreme Court required states to conform to “clinical
definitions” when determining whether a defendant has intellectual disability
for the purpose of Atkins.37 The Hall Court noted that the Atkins majority
relied on clinical definitions from then-current Diagnostic and Statistical
Manual of Mental Disorders, 4th Edition (DSM-IV) to make its decision.38

31

32
33
34
35

36

37

38

See, e.g., People v. Mendoza, 62 Cal.4th 856, 911 (Cal. 2016) (rejecting defendant’s proposed
exemption from the death penalty due to his mental illness in part because the “defendant [did] not
offer a definition of what level of mental illness would constitute serious mental illness.”).
See Part II.B supra (explaining the definition of “severe mental illness”).
572 U.S. 701 (2014).
137 S. Ct. 1039 (2017).
See Michelle Armstrong, Note, Addressing Defendants Who Are “Crazy, But Not Crazy Enough”:
How Hall v. Florida Changes the Death Penalty For Mentally Ill Defendants , 47 U. TOL. L. REV.
743, 753 (2016) (explaining reliance on medical expertise in Hall); Moore, 137 S. Ct. at 1053
(reasoning that “[t]he medical community’s current [intellectual disability] standards supply one
constraint on States’ lee-way” to impose the death penalty).
See ABA Recommendation 122A, 7–9 (explaining the proposed significant impairment
requirement).
Hall, 572 U.S. at 719–20. See also, Armstrong, supra note 35, at 753 (explaining reliance on medical
experts in Hall).
Hall, 572 U.S. at 719 (citing Atkins, 536 U.S. at 308 n.3).

March 2020]

PROHIBITING THE EXECUTION OF PEOPLE

107

The Hall Court followed this method by relying on the “views of medical
experts” and noting that “this Court and the States have placed substantial
reliance on the expertise of the medical profession” in determining the
category of people to whom Atkins would apply.39 The Court then required
that the legal determination of intellectual disability be “informed by the
medical community’s diagnostic framework.”40
Three years later in Moore, the Supreme Court further required states to
conform to the standards of medical professionals. The Court found that the
“medical community’s current standards supply one constraint on States’
leeway” to implement the holding of Atkins.41 The Court cited clinical
definitions in the most-recent edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual
of Mental Disorders, DSM-5, as reflective of current medical community
standards.42 The Supreme Court has thus required states to rely heavily on
medical professionals in determining which defendants have intellectual
disability for the purpose of applying Atkins.
B. Adopting Medical Professionals’ Definition of “Severe Mental Illness”
Would Resolve Basic Category Problems
Relying on medical professionals’ definition of “severe mental illness,”
similarly to reliance on the clinical definition of “intellectual disability” in
Atkins cases, would resolve basic category problems of a new categorical
prohibition. ABA Recommendation 122A’s definition of “severe mental
illness” represents the position of relevant medical professional organizations
on the category of mental illnesses that would qualify as “severe” enough to
sufficiently reduce culpability. The Recommendation was officially endorsed
by the American Psychological Association and the American Psychiatric
Association.43 It defines “severe” as signifying “a disorder that is roughly
equivalent to disorders that mental health professionals would consider the
most serious ‘Axis I diagnoses.’ These disorders include schizophrenia and
other psychotic disorders, mania, major depressive disorder, and dissociative
disorders – with schizophrenia being by far the most common disorder seen
in capital defendants.”44 The Recommendation also explains that “[s]ome

39
40
41

42
43
44

Id. at 721–22.
Id.
Moore v. Texas, 137 S. Ct. 1039, 1053 (2017). The Supreme Court recently revisited Moore and
once again reversed the decision of the Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas. See Moore v. Texas,
139 S.Ct. 666 (2019) (per curiam) (“We conclude that the appeals court’s opinion, when taken as a
whole and when read in the light both of our prior opinion and the trial court record, rests upon
analysis too much of which too closely resembles what we previously found improper.”).
Moore, 137 S. Ct. at 1053.
ABA Recommendation 122, at 3.
Id.
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conditions that are not considered an Axis I condition might also, on rare
occasions, become ‘severe’ as that word is used in this Recommendation.” 45
Courts should rely on this definition of “severe mental illness” and medical
professionals’ definitions of specific conditions to define the category for
whom a new prohibition would apply.
A new prohibition should also require an individuated determination that
the severe mental illness caused the defendant significant impairment at the
time of the crime. ABA Recommendation 122A includes this component.46
This requirement is necessary because of the heterogeneity of symptoms
among and within different mental illnesses.47 The Recommendation proposes
three kinds that would qualify: if the defendant “had a severe mental disorder
or disability that significantly impaired their capacity (a) to appreciate the
nature, consequences or wrongfulness of their conduct, (b) to exercise rational
judgment in relation to conduct, or (c) to conform their conduct to the
requirements of law.”48 This is a reasonable and workable standard that is
similar to many state insanity defenses.49 It is similar, but it is not already
encompassed in the insanity defense because the insanity defense requires a
stricter standard of complete lack of knowledge of what the person was doing
or that it was wrong.50 Courts should include the significant impairment
standard or something similar for a new categorical prohibition. This
significant impairment requirement along with the “severe mental illness”
requirement would resolve basic category problems in identifying people with
reduced culpability. Resolving basic category problems would go a long way
for creating a new categorical death penalty exemption for people with severe
mental illness. The next sections examine current opinion on the issue and
how a new prohibition may be created.

45

46

47

48
49

Id. at 6–7 (explaining that certain Axis II disorders may “at times experience more significant
dysfunction[]” like personality disorder).
Id. at 7–9. See id. at 7 (stating that the preclusion of a particular sentence based on diagnosis alone
is not sensible because the disorders may greatly vary).
See id. at 7 (“[F]or the disorders covered by the second part of this Recommendation, preclusion of
a death sentence based on diagnosis alone would not be sensible, because the symptoms of these
disorders are much more variable than those associated with retardation or other disabilities covered
by the Recommendation’s first paragraph.”).
Id. at 1.
See, e.g., 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 315(b) (2014)
“For purposes of this section, the phrase ‘legally insane’ means that, at the time of the
commission of the offense, the actor was laboring under such a defect of reason, from disease
of the mind, as not to know the nature and quality of the act he was doing or, if the actor did
know the quality of the act, that he did not know that what he was doing was wrong.”

50

See id (requiring complete lack of knowledge of the “nature and quality of the act” or that one “did
not know that what he was doing was wrong” to qualify for the insanity defense).
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IV. CURRENT OPINION ON THE ISSUE
At this time, courts are unlikely to create a new prohibition on executing
people with severe mental illness because there is not enough evidence of a
national consensus against the practice.51 This could change, however, if more
legislatures adopt the proposal of a prohibition on executing people who were
significantly impaired at the time of their crime from severe mental illness.
The Supreme Court in Atkins and Roper focused heavily on legislation and
legislative trends in finding a national consensus existed for prohibiting the
death penalty for people with intellectual disability and juveniles.52 On the issue
of an exemption for people with severe mental illness, only one state,
Connecticut, has ever passed legislation creating such an exemption.53 This
heavily weighted factor alone likely dooms any finding of a national
consensus.54 Other relevant factors generally support an exemption but are not
as heavily weighted as the legislative trend.55 Based on these factors, every court
that has considered the issue has found that no national consensus against the
practice exists.56 Lack of national consensus makes it extremely unlikely, but
not impossible, that a new judicially created exemption will be created for
people with severe mental illness until supporting legislation is passed.57 This
section examines current and historical legislation on the issue as well as
academic, popular, international, and medical and legal professional opinion
on the issue.

51

52

53

54

55
56
57

See, e.g., State v. Kleypas, 382 P.3d 373, 445–46 (Kan. 2016) (listing cases that have declined “to
extend the Atkins and Roper rationale to the mentally ill” and concluding there is a “lack of legislative
direction”).
Atkins, 536 U.S. at 312 (quoting Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 331 (1989) (“[T]he clearest and
most reliable objective evidence of contemporary values is the legislation enacted by the country’s
legislatures.”) (internal quotations omitted). See also Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 564–67 (2005)
(comparing state legislation in order to determine whether there is a national consensus); Atkins, 536
U.S. at 315 (“It is not so much the number of these States that is significant, but the consistency of
the direction of change.”) (footnote omitted).
Kleypas, 382 P.3d at 445. See also CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-46a(h) (2009) (abolishing the death
penalty for persons with intellectual disabilities or persons whose mental capacity was significantly
impaired). Connecticut subsequently abolished the death penalty completely in 2012. See Kleypas,
382 P.3d at 445.
See cases cited supra note 52 (“[T]he clearest and most reliable objective evidence of contemporary
values is the legislation enacted by the country’s legislatures.”) (internal quotations omitted).
See infra Part IV.B.
See Part V infra.
Courts also conduct an independent analysis of the issue in addition to considering whether a national
consensus exists. See, e.g., Roper, 543 U.S. at 564 (“We then must determine, in the exercise of our
own independent judgment, whether the death penalty is a disproportionate punishment for
juveniles.”).
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A. Legislation on the Issue
In creating exemptions from the death penalty, the Supreme Court has
focused extensively on legislative opinion on an issue.58 The Atkins Court
relied heavily on “objective” factors, particularly state legislation, in prohibiting
the execution of people with intellectual disability.59 The Court noted that
eighteen states and the federal government had laws prohibiting the execution
of people with intellectual disability and similar laws had passed at least one
house in a minimum of three other states.60 The Court emphasized that in
considering the persuasive force of legislation it “is not so much the number
of these States that is significant, but the consistency of the direction of
change.”61 The Court concluded that this factor and others “unquestionably
reflects widespread judgment about the relative culpability of mentally
retarded offenders[.]”62 The majority also relied on the opinions medical
professional organizations, religious groups in the United States, foreign law,
and polling data.63 Three years later, a similar majority64 in Roper relied on
similar data to prohibit the execution of juveniles.65

58

59

60

61

62
63

64

65

See cases cited supra note 52 (“[T]he clearest and most reliable objective evidence of contemporary
values is the legislation enacted by the country’s legislatures.”) (internal quotations omitted).
Atkins, 536 U.S. at 312–17 (analyzing state legislation prohibiting the execution of people with
intellectual disability).
Id. at 313–16. See also id. at 313–15 (noting that U.S. Congress, Georgia, Maryland, Kentucky,
Tennessee, New Mexico, Arkansas, Colorado, Washington, Indiana, Kansas, New York, Nebraska,
South Dakota, Arizona, Connecticut, Florida, Missouri, and North Carolina have prohibited the
execution of persons with intellectual disabilities and similar bills have passed at least in one house
of other States).
Id. at 315 (footnote omitted). This statement was likely in response to strong criticism by the
dissenting Justices who argued that eighteen states - less than half of states that employ the death
penalty at the time - do not constitute a national consensus. Id. at 342–44 (Scalia, J. dissenting).
Id. at 317.
Id. at 316–17 n.21. The dissenting Justices, however, sharply criticized the use of these facts as
evidence of national consensus. Id. at 347–48 (Scalia, J. dissenting).
The majority in Atkins included Justices Stevens, O’Connor, Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, and
Breyer. Dissenters included Justices Rehnquist, Scalia, and Thomas. See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 321.
The majority in Roper included Justices Stevens, Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer. Dissenters
included Justices Rehnquist, O’Connor, Scalia, and Thomas. See, Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551,
587,607 (2005). Justice O’Connor was the only justice to change position, from the majority in Atkins
to the dissent in Roper.
See Roper, 543 U.S. at 564
“The evidence of national consensus against the death penalty for juveniles is similar, and in
some respects parallel, to the evidence Atkins held sufficient to demonstrate a national
consensus against the death penalty for the mentally retarded . . . . By a similar calculation in this
case, 30 States prohibit the juvenile death penalty, comprising 12 that have rejected the death
penalty altogether and 18 that maintain it but, by express provision or judicial interpretation,
exclude juveniles from its reach.”
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There is unfortunately no similar legislative trend toward prohibiting the
death penalty for people with severe mental illness.66 Only one state,
Connecticut, has ever passed such legislation.67 The 2009 Connecticut
legislation prohibited the execution of defendants if “the defendant’s mental
capacity was significantly impaired or the defendant’s ability to conform the
defendant’s conduct to the requirements of law was significantly impaired but
not so impaired in either case as to constitute a defense to prosecution.”68 This
model conforms with the proposal above of a “severe mental illness” and
“significant impairment” requirement. This law is not still on the books,
however, because Connecticut subsequently abolished the death penalty in
2012.69
Other state legislatures in Kentucky, North Carolina, Indiana, and
Tennessee have considered similar legislation but none of have passed it. 70
The Kentucky and North Carolina legislatures have both considered
legislation with wording directly from ABA Recommendation 122A.71 Indiana
considered proposed legislation in 2009 to ban the execution of individuals
with ‘severe mental illness,’ defined as a diagnosis of schizophrenia,
schizoaffective disorder, bipolar disorder, major depression, or delusional
disorder.72 A bill has also been recently proposed in South Carolina with
language similar to ABA Recommendation 122A.73 Considering that there is

66

67
68
69
70

71

72
73

See State v. Kleypas, 382 P.3d 373, 445 (Kan. 2016) (finding no legislative trend towards extending
Atkins and Roper to persons with a mental illness).
Id.
Id.; CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a–46a(h)(2) (2009).
Kleypas, 382 P.3d at 445.
Id. (“Kleypas cites relatively recent bills introduced in the legislatures of Kentucky, North Carolina,
Indiana, and Tennessee . . . . However, none of these states actually passed legislation and all of them
still retain the death penalty.”).
See AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, Resources on Severe Mental Illness and Death Penalty, (Nov.
29,
2018)
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/crsj/projects/death_penalty_due_process_review_project/serio
us-mental-illness-initiative-/resources0/ (listing proposed legislation prohibiting the death penalty for
people with severe or serious mental illness).

Id.
Elle Klein, Flying over the Cuckoo’s Nest: How the Mentally Ill Landed into an Unconstitutional
Punishment in South Carolina, 68 S.C. L. REV. 571, 595 (2017)
Bill 3535, currently residing in the House Judiciary Committee, was proposed to the South
Carolina legislature in February 2015. This bill would ban the execution of an offender that
had a severe mentally disability at the time of the commission of the crime. The bill defines
severe mental disability as “a severe mental illness that significantly impairs a person’s capacity
to do any of the following: (i) appreciate the nature, consequences, or wrongfulness of the
person’s conduct; (ii) exercise rational judgment in relation to conduct; or (iii) conform the
person’s conduct to the requirements of the law . . .” or as “dementia or traumatic brain injury
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no current legislation prohibiting the execution of people significantly
impaired by severe mental illness at the time of their crime and only one state
has ever done so, there is no legislative trend against these executions.
B. Academic, Popular, International, and Medical Professional Opinion
Academic, popular, international, and medical professional opinion can
also be evidence that a national consensus exists74 but offer mixed results on a
death penalty exemption for people with severe mental illness. These factors
do not universally support the position and are not as heavily weighted as
legislative trend.75
Academic opinion presents mixed reviews of a new death penalty
prohibition. The possibility of a new death penalty exemption for people with
severe mental illness was considered by legal commentators soon after the
2002 Atkins decision, including articles in 2003 by Christopher Slobogin and
Dr. Douglas Mossman.76 Slobogin argued that allowing the executions of
people with severe mental illness while at the same time prohibiting the
execution of people with intellectual disability violates the Equal Protection
Clause.77 Slobogin presented an interesting argument but it has not gained any
traction.78 Dr. Mossman, a psychiatrist, advocated for a different approach. He
argued that Atkins was wrongly decided and should not be extended to people
with severe mental illness.79 Mossman argued that Atkins mistakenly treats
people with intellectual disability as a discrete group, improperly requires
relying on diagnoses to make legal decisions, and unwisely requires
considering extending the prohibition to other psychiatric disabilities.80 It may
also negatively affect discrimination against people with intellectual disability.81
Subsequent articles by other commentators have been mostly supportive of

that results in significantly sub-average general intellectual functioning, existing concurrently
with significant limitations in adaptive functioning” (citations omitted).
74

75

76

77
78

79
80
81

See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 316–17 n.21 (2002) (finding academic, popular, international, and medical
professional opinion relevant to whether a national consensus existed against the execution of people
with intellectual disability).
See cases cited supra note 52 (“the clearest and most reliable objective evidence of contemporary
values is the legislation enacted by the country’s legislatures”).
See generally Slobogin, supra note 8; Douglas Mossman, Atkins v. Virginia: A Psychiatric Can of
Worms, 33 N.M. L. REV. 255 (2003).
Slobogin, supra note 8.
See discussion in Part V infra (showing that no courts have accepted that executing defendants with
severe mental illness violates the Equal Protection clause).
Mossman, supra note 76, at 256.

Id.
Id. at 272–73. This article answers these objections in the discussion of Part VI, infra.
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prohibiting the execution of people with severe mental illness.82 More
consensus would have to be reached in order to consider this factor to weigh
heavily in favor of a new death penalty prohibition.
On public opinion, few polls have been conducted on the issue but the
few seem to support prohibiting the execution of people with severe mental
illness. A 2014 Public Policy Polling national survey of 943 registered voters
found that 58 percent opposed death penalty eligibility for people with mental
illness, 28 percent supported eligibility, and 14 percent were not sure.83
According to the poll, the divide was not along political lines as Republicans,
Democrats, and Independents all opposed death penalty eligibility for people
with mental illness.84 Similarly, a 2015 multi-state voter survey found that 66
percent of voters supported a death penalty exemption for mental illness again
across the political spectrum.85 Many more comprehensive studies would have
to be done to draw significant conclusions on public opinion of the issue. For
example, the Atkins court considered more than thirty public opinion polls
when deciding that case.86
On international opinion, many international organizations oppose the
execution of people with severe mental illness, but the relevance of

82

See, e.g., Aurélie Tabuteau Mangels, Should Individuals with Severe Mental Illness Continue to Be
Eligible for the Death Penalty, 32 CRIM. JUST. 9, 11–13 (2017) (supporting a categorical prohibition
on execution of people with severe mental illness); Lyn Entzeroth, The Challenge And Dillemna Of
Charting A Course To Constitutionally Protect The Severely Mentally Ill Capital Defendant From
The Death Penalty, 44 AKRON L. REV. 529, 561 (2011) (supporting a severe mental illness
exemption and analyzing the “tough road ahead” for its possibility); Pamela A. Wilkins, Rethinking
Categorical Prohibitions on Capital Punishment: How the Current Test Fails Mentally Ill Offenders
and What to Do About It, 40 U. MEM. L. REV. 423, 470–71 (supporting a categorical prohibition on
execution of people with severe mental illness); William W. Berry III, Evolved Standards, Evolving
Justices? The Case For A Broader Application of the Eighth Amendment , 96 WASH. U. L. REV.
106, 131 (2018) (supporting an expansion of Atkins to prohibit the death penalty for people with
severe mental illness). But see Joseph Hess, The Death Penalty for Mentally Ill Offenders: Atkins,
Roper, and Mitigation Factors Militate Against Categorical Exemption, 90 U. DET. MERCY L. REV.
93, 111 (2012) (arguing against a categorical exemption because no “objective indicia” indicate that
executing people with severe mental illness has become unusual and mental illness as a mitigating
factor offers enough protection); Mark E. Coon, Drawing the Line at Atkins and Roper: The Case

Against Additional Categorical Exemptions from Capital Punishment for Offenders with Conditions
Affecting Brain Function, 115 W. VA. L. REV. 1221, 1224 (2013) (arguing against extending
83

84

85

86

categorical exemption from capital punishment to “additional classes of offenders”).
Poll: Americans Oppose Executing Mentally Ill By 2-to-1 Margin, DEATH PENALTY INFORMATION
CENTER (Dec. 1, 2014), https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/news/poll-americans-oppose-death-penalty-formentally-ill-by-2-1.
Id. (listing the percentage of members in each political party that opposes executing the mentally ill:
Democrats 62%, Republicans 59%, Independents 51%).
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION DEATH PENALTY DUE PROCESS REVIEW PROJECT, SEVERE
MENTAL ILLNESS AND THE DEATH PENALTY (2016) [hereinafter ABA Report 2016], at 36.
See Atkins, 536 U.S at 328–36 (Rehnquist, J. dissenting) (listing “Poll and survey results reported in
Brief for American Association on Mental Retardation et al.”).
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international opinion is greatly contested by judges. Many international
organizations have advocated for a prohibition against executing people with
severe mental illness.87 The Atkins majority considered international opinion
relevant to whether a consensus exists against the practice. 88 The Roper
majority similarly acknowledged “the overwhelming weight of international
opinion against the juvenile death penalty” when deciding to prohibit it. 89
International opposition to executing people with severe mental illness may
be similarly overwhelming. The United Nations (U.N.) Commission on
Human Rights, the U.N. General Assembly, the European Union, the
Council of Europe, and the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights
have all advocated for a prohibition against executing people with mental
illness.90 The European Union, which opposes the death penalty entirely, has
called on countries that still maintain the death penalty to prohibit the
execution of “persons suffering from any mental illness.”91 Advocacy by the
European Union may have some persuasive force for courts, as the Atkins
majority cited the European Union position as persuasive evidence in creating
a categorical prohibition on the execution of people with intellectual
disability.92 However, international opinion is not controlling and is generally
considered to be only marginally relevant compared to other factors. 93 Some
judges, particularly conservative judges, do not consider international opinion
relevant at all.94 The persuasiveness of international opinion is thus
questionable at best.
On medical professional opinion: Major medical professional
organizations support a new prohibition on executing people with severe
mental illness who were significantly impaired at the time of their crime. 95 The
Supreme Court in Atkins relied in part on the opinion of medical professional
organizations in finding a national consensus existed against executing people
with intellectual disability.96 The major organizations cited by the Supreme
87

88
89
90
91
92
93

94

95

96

See ABA Report 2016, at 35–36 (listing international organizations that have advocated for an
exemption from the death penalty for people with mental illness).
Atkins, 536 U.S. at 316–17 n.21.
Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005).
ABA Report 2016, at 35–36.
ABA Report 2016, at 35.
Atkins, 536 U.S. at 316 n. 21.
See, e.g., Runyon v. Virginia, 228 F.Supp.3d 569, 649 (E.D. Va. 2017) (finding international cases
and law to be less instructive than state and federal cases that have addressed the issue).
The dissenters in Atkins and Roper considered international opinion totally irrelevant. See Atkins,
536 U.S. at 322 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority’s use of “foreign laws”).
See ABA Recommendation 122A, at 3 (“The American Psychiatric Association and the American
Psychological Association have officially endorsed the Task Force’s proposal.”).
See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 316–17 n.21 (citing briefs by the American Psychological Association et al.
and the AAMR [American Association on Mental Retardation et al.] as relevant evidence to the
existence of a national consensus).
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Court currently support a death penalty exemption for people with severe
mental illness.97 However, some judges have expressed doubts about whether
medical professional opinion should be relied on.98 Medical professional
opinion thus offers mixed results.
In Atkins, the majority relied in part on the opinion of medical
professional organizations to find that a national consensus existed against
executing people with intellectual disability. 99 In footnote 21 of Atkins, the
Court found that “Additional evidence makes it clear that this legislative
judgment [against the execution of people with intellectual disability] reflects a
much broader social and professional consensus.”100 To demonstrate
professional consensus, the Court noted that “several organizations with
germane expertise have adopted official positions opposing the imposition of
the death penalty upon a mentally retarded offender.”101 As examples of these
organizations that have “germane expertise” that adopted this official position,
the Court cited two briefs.102 The first was an amicus brief for the American
Psychological Association,103 the American Psychiatric Association,104 and the
American Academy of Psychiatry and the Law.105 The second was an amicus
brief for the American Association on Mental Retardation (now named the

97
98

99

100
101
102
103

104

105

See ABA recommendation 122A, at 3.
See, e.g., United States v. Sampson, 2015 WL 7962394, at *12 (D. Mass. 2015) (“Recognizing that
this court may consider the views of the professional organizations that [the defendant] cites, the court
finds that they are not as important indicia of contemporary values as the actions of legislatures.”).
See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 316–17 n.21 (2002) (discussing briefs by the American Psychological
Association et al. and the AAMR [American Association on Mental Retardation] et al. as relevant
evidence to the existence of a national consensus).

Id.
Id.
Id.
The American Psychological Association describes itself as “the leading scientific and professional
organization representing psychology in the United States, with more than 118,000 researchers,
educators, clinicians, consultants and students as its members.” About Us, AMERICAN
PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION (last visited Feb. 25, 2019), https://www.apa.org/about/index.
The American Psychiatric Association describes itself as having “more than 38,500 members
involved in psychiatric practice, research, and academia representing the diversity of the patients for
whom they care. As the leading psychiatric organization in the world, APA now encompasses
members practicing in more than 100 countries.” About APA, AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC
ASSOCIATION (last visited Feb. 25, 2019), https://www.psychiatry.org/about-apa.
Atkins, 536 U.S. at 316–17 n.21. See also Brief for American Psychological Association et al. as
Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner, McCarver v. North Carolina, 533 U.S. 975 (2001) (No. 008727). The American Psychological Academy of Psychiatry and the Law [AAPL] describes itself as
“an organization of psychiatrists dedicated to excellence in practice, teaching, and research in forensic
psychiatry. Founded in 1969, AAPL currently has over 2,000 members in North America and
around the world.” About the Organization, AMERICAN ACADEMY OF PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAW
(last visited Feb. 25, 2019), http://www.aapl.org/organization.
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American Association on Intellectual and Developmental Disabilities).106
The Atkins Court thus used the opinion of medical professional organizations
as evidence in determining whether a national consensus exists against
imposing the death penalty on certain groups.107
Relevant medical professional organizations have adopted official
positions opposing the imposition of the death penalty on defendants with
severe mental illness.108 The American Psychological Association and the
American Psychiatric Association have officially endorsed this position.109
These associations were cited by the Supreme Court in Atkins footnote 21 as
having “germane expertise” on a death penalty exemption for people with
intellectual disability.110 Their opinion should therefore be considered
evidence for whether a professional consensus exists against the execution of
people with severe mental illness.
The American Psychological Association and the American Psychiatric
Association’s endorsement of American Bar Association Recommendation
122A reflects their official position on the issue.111 The Recommendation
resulted from the assembly of a “Task Force on Mental Disability and the
Death Penalty” that met shortly after the decision in Atkins between April
2003 and March 2005.112 The Task Force was “composed of 24 lawyers and
mental health professionals (both practitioners and academics), and included
members of the American Psychiatric Association and the American
Psychological Association.”113 The Recommendation in part recommends the
prohibition of the “execution of persons with severe mental disabilities whose

106

107

108

109
110
111

112
113

The AAMR is now named the American Association on Intellectual and Developmental Disabilities
[AAIDD). See About Us, AMERICAN ASSOCIATION ON INTELLECTUAL AND DEVELOPMENTAL
DISABILITIES (last visited Feb. 25, 2019), https://aaidd.org/about-aaidd (noting that the AAIDD is
the new name of AAMR). The organization describes itself as having “membership over 5,000 strong
in the United States and in 55 countries worldwide, AAIDD is the leader in advocating quality of life
and rights for those with intellectual disabilities.” Id.
The dissenters in Atkins, however, did not agree that the opinion of medical professional
organizations was relevant. See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 324 (Rehnquist, J. dissenting) (“In my view, these
two sources–the work product of legislatures and sentencing jury determinations–ought to be the sole
indicators by which courts ascertain the contemporary American conceptions of decency for
purposes of the Eighth Amendment.”).
See ABA Report 2016, at 1 (“It has now been 10 years since the American Bar Association (ABA),
in conjunction with the American Psychiatric Association, American Psychological Association and
National Alliance on Mental Illness (NAMI) adopted a policy opposing the death penalty for
individuals with severe mental disorders or disabilities present at the time a crime is committed . . .
.”).
Id.
Atkins, 536 U.S. at 316–17 n.21.
ABA Recommendation 122A, at 3 (stating that The American Psychiatric Association and the
American Psychological Association have endorsed the Task Force’s proposal).

Id.
Id.
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demonstrated impairments of mental and emotional functioning at the time
of the offense would render a death sentence disproportionate to their
culpability.”114 The relevant medical professional organizations thus support an
exemption on the death penalty for people with severe mental illness. Medical
professional organizations’ opinion supports the finding of a national
consensus on the issue.
V. COURTS THAT HAVE ADDRESSED THE ISSUE
Every court that has considered the issue has found a lack of national
consensus and declined to create a categorical death penalty exemption for
people with severe mental illness.115 Federal courts that have considered and
rejected a new categorical exemption include the 5th Circuit,116 the 6th
Circuit,117 the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces,118 the District of
Massachusetts,119 the Northern District of Oklahoma,120 and the Eastern
District of Virginia.121 State courts that have similarly considered the issue

114
115

116

117
118

119

120

121

Id. at 5.
See State v. Kleypas, 382 P.3d 373, 445 (Kan. 2016) (listing many cases that have addressed the issue
and explaining that the “lack of legislative direction has also led courts who have considered the issue
to decline to extend the Atkins and Roper rationale to the mentally ill.”).
See Mays v. Stephens, 757 F.3d 211, 219 (5th Cir. 2014) (“Mays seeks a COA on the ground that
the Eighth Amendment prohibits his execution because he is mentally ill. Fifth Circuit precedent
however, forecloses that.”).
See Franklin v. Bradshaw, 695 F.3d 439, 455 (6th Cir. 2012) (declining to extend Atkins).
See United States v. Akbar, 74 M.J. 364, 406 (Armed Forces App. 2015) (noting that “courts have
uniformly determined that there is no constitutional impediment to imposing a capital sentence
where a criminal defendant suffers from a mental illness.”) (footnote omitted).
See United States v. Sampson, 2015 WL 7962394 at *13 (D. Mass. 2015) (“However ‘severe’ mental
illness is defined, the defendant has not identified objective indicia sufficient to prove that current
standards of decency are incompatible with imposing a death sentence on a person suffering from a
severe mental illness.”).
See Thacker v. Workman, 2010 WL 3466707 at *24 (N.D. Okla. 2010) (“Neither Atkins nor Roper
established, let alone clearly established, a rule that it would be a constitutional violation to execute
persons suffering from a mental disorder such as bipolar disorder.”).
See Runyon v. United States, 228 F.Supp.3d 569, 649 (E.D. Va. 2017) (“After evaluating the
decisions by both federal and state courts that have chosen not to extend Roper and Atkins, this court
finds it inappropriate to extend the holdings or the reasoning in Atkins and Roper to defendants with
severe mental illness, absent Supreme Court authority.”).
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include the highest courts of California,122 Florida,123 Georgia,124 Idaho,125
Indiana,126 Kansas,127 Kentucky,128 Missouri,129 Ohio,130 and Pennsylvania131 as
well as criminal appeals courts in Alabama,132 Oklahoma,133 Tennessee,134 and
Texas.135 These cases represent analysis of the issue in more than half of the
United States jurisdictions that currently have the death penalty on the
books.136 Most of these cases contain limited analysis of the issue and simply
list other cases that have addressed the issue or lack of Supreme Court support
and find that no prohibition has been created.137 Though no majority opinion
has accepted an argument to extend Atkins to people with severe mental

122

123

124

125

126

127

128

129

130

131

132

133

134

135

136

137

See People v. Mendoza, 62 Cal. 4th 856, 911 (Cal. 2016) (rejecting the defendant’s request to extend
Atkins and Roper).
See Simmons v. State, 105 So.3d 475, 511 (Fla. 2012) (explaining that the Florida Supreme Court
has recently and repeatedly rejected claims to bar the death penalty for defendants with severe mental
illness).
See Lewis v. State, 620 S.E. 2d. 778, 786 (Ga. 2005) (“Lewis also does not cite any authority that
establishes a constitutional prohibition on convicting and sentencing to death a defendant who is
competent but mentally ill, and we decline to extend the holdings of cases like Atkins that he cites as
being analogous.”).
See State v. Dunlap, 313 P.3d 1, 36 (Idaho 2013) (“We join these courts in holding that a defendant’s
mental illness does not prevent imposition of a capital sentence.”).
See Matheney v. State, 833 N.E.2d 454, 458 (Ind. 2005) (“Matheney has not convinced us that he
has a reasonable possibility of establishing that mentally ill persons are on the same footing as
mentally retarded persons under the Atkins rationale.”).
See State v. Kleypas, 382 P.3d 373, 448 (Kan. 2016) (concluding that “the Eighth Amendment does
not categorically prohibit the execution of offenders who are severely mentally ill at the time of their
crimes.”).
See Dunlap v. Com., 435 S.W.3d 537, 616 (Ky. 2013) (“We are not prepared to hold that mentally
ill persons are categorically ineligible for the death penalty.”).
See State v. Johnson, 207 S.W.3d 24, 51 (Mo. 2006) (en banc) (refusing to extend Atkins to people
with mental illness).
See State v. Mammone, 13 N.E.3d 1051, 1089 (Ohio 2014) (finding that “the Eighth Amendment
does not bar the execution of the seriously mentally ill . . . .”).
See Com. v. Baumhammers, 599 Pa. 1, 61–63 (Pa. 2008) (refusing to extend Atkins to people with
mental illness).
See Dotch v. State, 67 So.3d 936, 1006 (Ala. Crim. App. 2010) (refusing to “extend or expand the
constitutional prohibitions against the application of the death penalty . . . .”).
See Malone v. State, 293 P.3d 198, 216 (Okla. Crim. App. 2013) (“We expressly reject that the
Atkins rule or rationale applies to the mentally ill.”).
See Pike v. State, 2011 WL 1544207, at *67–68 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2011) (declining to extend Roper
or Atkins).
See Mays v. State, 318 S.W.3d 368, 379 (Tex. Crim. 2010) (rejecting an extension of Atkins or
Roper).
These jurisdictions include the fourteen states listed above as well as the U.S. government and U.S.
military. See State by State, DEATH PENALTY INFORMATION CENTER (last visited Sept. 11, 2019),
https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/states-and-without-death-penalty (listing the thirty one jurisdictions in the
United States that institute the death penalty).
See, e.g., State v. Dunlap, 313 P.3d 1, 36 (Idaho 2013) (listing the other cases that have considered
the issue and concluding that the Supreme Court of Idaho would “join these courts in holding that a
defendant’s mental illness does not prevent imposition of a capital sentence.”).
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illness, some judges have accepted it in concurring or dissenting opinions.138
This of course has little to no weight as evidence of national consensus.
The fact that no court has found a national consensus exists against the
practice and no new legislation against it has been passed dooms the finding
of a national consensus. This could change, though, if new legislation is passed.
State legislatures should consider the above arguments about the reduced
culpability of people with severe mental illness significantly impaired at the
time of their crime to create a new prohibition of this kind. It would be a
benefit to their own state and possibly the whole country because if a trend
can be created, then a national consensus could be found against the practice
nationwide.
VI. THE PARTIAL SUCCESS OF THIS APPROACH IN KLEYPAS
The 2016 Kansas Supreme Court case State v. Kleypas139 illustrates how
this approach may work with reliance on medical professionals’ definition of
“severe mental illness.” In 2016, the Kansas Supreme Court considered a
request made by death row defendant Gary Kleypas to create a categorical
death penalty exemption for people who had severe mental illness at the time
of their crime. 140 The court’s decision on the issue was remarkable for its
preliminary acceptance of Kleypas’s proposed category of people to whom the
exception would apply by reference to ABA Recommendation 122A.141 The
court also found that Kleypas had standing to raise the issue because several
experts had diagnosed him with schizophrenia and dissociative disorders,
which would qualify as “severe” under the ABA Recommendation 122A
criteria.142 However, the court denied Kleypas’s proposal because they found
that no national consensus existed against the executions and in the court’s
independent judgment a categorical prohibition was not necessary.143 Although
the Kleypas court only accepted the reliance on medical professional

138

139
140
141

142
143

See, e.g., Bryan v. Mullin, 335 F.3d 1207, 1227–28 (10th Cir. 2003) (Henry, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part) (invoking Atkins to argue that the execution of a mentally ill defendant
contributes nothing to the goals of retribution or deterrence and is unconstitutional); Corcoran v.
State, 774 N.E.2d 495, 502 (Ind. 2002) (Rucker, J., dissenting) (“[T]he underlying rationale for
prohibiting executions of the mentally retarded is just as compelling for prohibiting executions of the
seriously mentally ill . . . .”); Joshua v. Adams, 231 Fed. App’x 592, 599 (9th Cir. 2007) (Ferguson,
J., dissenting) (arguing that the execution of a mentally ill defendant violates the Eighth Amendment
because mental illness reduces culpability).
State v. Kleypas, 382 P.3d. 373 (Kan. 2016).
Id. at 443. Kleypas should have proposed a solution similar to the one outlined here.
See id. at 443–44 (citing ABA Recommendation 122A at length and concluding that “these standards
set out a specific enough category to allow consideration of Kleypas’ arguments.”).
Id. at 444.
Id. at 444–48.
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standards to define “severe mental illness” for the preliminary questions in the
case, the decision marks a significant step on the issue and indicates how it
may be successful in the future.

A. Kleypas Factual Background
Gary Kleypas’ factual and procedural situation represents a typical
situation for defendants arguing for a new death penalty exemption based on
severe mental illness. His crime was horrific, but there was substantial
evidence that he was significantly impaired by severe mental illness at the time
of his crime.
Kleypas was convicted for the 1996 murder, attempted rape, and
aggravated burglary of a woman C.W.144 The state offered evidence of several
aggravating factors in seeking the death penalty. 145 These included Kleypas’s
previous conviction for the 1977 murder of a Missouri woman and the
heinous nature of his murder of C.W. 146 He forced himself inside her
apartment, attempted to rape her, stabbed her repeatedly in the chest when
she struggled, and stole her engagement ring and other things from her purse. 147
He then disposed of some of her things in a dumpster, returned to his
apartment, and planned to leave town before his arrest.148
In his defense, Kleypas offered evidence of several mitigating factors that
focused primarily on his history of chronic mental illness and “severely
deteriorated” mental state at the time of his crime.149 He called many witnesses
to support these claims.150 Dr. Marilyn Hutchinson, a mitigation specialist and
clinical and forensic psychologist, evaluated him between 2002 and 2004 and
“described him as severely disturbed with a history of chronic maladjustment
that caused behavioral control problems.”151 She also described his many
diagnoses beginning in 1977 that showed “a history of dissociation, psychotic
and paranoid thoughts, schizophrenic activity, alcohol and drug abuse, sexual

144
145
146
147
148
149

150

151

Id. at 389–90.
Id. at 390–91.
Id.
Id. at 390.
Id. at 390–91.
Id. at 391 (“In defense, Kleypas presented evidence of four mitigating circumstances: (1) Kleypas had
a chronic mental illness and chronic maladjustment that had led to behavioral control problems
throughout his life; (2) Kleypas’ mental status at the time of the crime was severely deteriorated; (3)
when medicated, Kleypas’ mental status dramatically improved; and (4) Kleypas’ family had suffered
a great deal and putting him to death would cause them additional suffering.”).
Kleypas’ witnesses included “a mitigation specialist who was a clinical and forensic psychologist; a
clinical child psychologist; a psychologist who had researched factors that cause a risk of violence; a
physician who had performed two brain scans on Kleypas; Kleypas’ mother; and two individuals who
had supervised Kleypas when he had been incarcerated in a Missouri prison.” Id.

Id.
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perversion, and a significant personality disorder.”152 Dr. Hutchinson
described Kleypas’ mental state at the time of the crime as “being negatively
affected by major depression with psychosis and agitation; paraphilia including
very disturbed sexual ideas; a personality disorder not otherwise specified;
traits of narcissism, avoidance, and dependency; a schizotypal personality; and
antisocial behavior.”153 She based this opinion on observations by people who
knew Kleypas around the time of the crime. 154 Witnesses described his
disturbed behavior including screaming for no reason and having
hallucinations in his jail cell, and Dr. Hutchinson assigned him an extremely
low global assessment of functioning (GAF) score.155 Evidence also suggested
that Kleypas’ condition improved while he was on medication.156 In rebuttal,
the state offered the testimony of Dr. William Logan, a forensic psychiatrist,
who testified that Kleypas was triggered primarily by sexual attraction and
committed the crime in an organized way to avoid detection suggesting lack of
delusion and disorientation.157 The jury unanimously sentenced Kleypas to
death, finding that the aggravating factors had been sufficient and were not
outweighed by the mitigating factors.158
B. Reliance on Medical Professional Organizations’ Definition of “Severe
Mental Illness” in Kleypas
The Kleypas court’s analysis is unique among cases that have addressed
the issue because the court found that the standards of ABA Recommendation
122A “set out a specific enough category to allow consideration of Kleypas’
arguments.”159 Kleypas asked the court to create a categorical prohibition on
executing people with severe mental illness at the time of their crime and apply
it to him.160 The state argued that the category of severe mental illness was
incapable of definition.161 The court agreed with Kleypas that the category was
capable of definition by relying on ABA Recommendation 122A and quoting
its relevant language.162 The court further found that Kleypas had standing to
raise the issue because several mental health professionals who examined him

152
153
154
155
156
157
158
159
160
161
162

Id.
Id. at 391–92.
Id. at 392.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 392–93.
Id. at 393.
Id. at 444.
Id. at 443.
Id.
Id. at 444.
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diagnosed him with schizophrenia and dissociative disorders.163 These
diagnoses are explicitly listed as qualifying for the “severe” requirement in
ABA Recommendation 122A.164
The Kansas Supreme Court’s position on the category differs from other
courts that have addressed the issue. Some other courts that have addressed
the issue found that the category of mental illness that would count as “severe”
could not been established.165 By accepting the criteria of ABA
Recommendation 122A for preliminary arguments, the Kansas Supreme
Court demonstrated a potential resolution of category problems for a future
prohibition on the execution of people with severe mental illness.
Unfortunately, the Kansas Supreme Court did not adopt the prohibition
proposed here and in ABA Recommendation 122A based on common
objections.166 These and others are addressed in the following section.
VII. OBJECTIONS
This section will address the major objections to a proposal for a new
prohibition on the execution of people with severe mental illness who were
significantly impaired by their illness at the time of their crime. This article has
already proposed solutions to the objection that “severe mental illness” cannot
be defined by relying on the standards of medical professionals.167 It has also
already proposed a solution to the individuation issue by proposing a
requirement of “significant impairment.”168 The following three objections
have not already been addressed and should be considered thoroughly by any
legislature or court in considering whether to create a new prohibition. All
three can be answered satisfactorily.
A. The Reduced Culpability of People with Severe Mental Illness Can Be

163
164
165

166

167
168

Id.
ABA Recommendation 122A (2006).
See, e.g., People v. Mendoza, 62 Cal.4th 856, 911 (Cal. 2016) (finding that the “defendant does not
offer a definition of what level of mental illness would constitute serious mental illness.”); State v.
Hancock, 840 N.E.2d 1032, 1059 (Ohio 2006) (finding that the defendant did not sufficiently define
“severe mental illness”).
See State v. Kleypas, 382 P.3d. 373, 446–48 (Kan. 2016) (rejecting a categorical prohibition of the
death penalty based on the classification of mental illness).
See supra Part III(B).
See ABA Recommendation 122A (2006) (explaining the proposed “significant impairment”
requirement).
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Sufficiently Accounted for in Sentencing
This objection argues that people with severe mental illness are already
sufficiently protected in trial, sentencing, and execution procedures.169 At trial,
defendants deemed “incompetent” cannot be prosecuted.170 Most states also
have an “insanity defense” that exempts criminal defendants from full criminal
punishment.171 The Supreme Court has further ruled that defendants who are
“insane” at the time of execution cannot be executed.172 Mental illness can also
be used as a mitigating factor in sentencing.173 The objection, accepted by some
courts including the Kansas Supreme Court in Kleypas, argues that these
protections sufficiently account for the reduced culpability of people with
severe mental illness. As the Kleypas court explains, “We have confidence
that Kansas juries can weigh a defendant’s mental state at the time of the crime
as a mitigating factor for consideration in the decision of whether to return a
death penalty verdict.”174 Unfortunately, however, the use of severe mental
illness as a mitigating factor does not sufficiently account for reduced
culpability as it did not for people with intellectual disability in Atkins and
juveniles in Roper.
The Supreme Court in Atkins and Roper determined that use as a
mitigating factor was not sufficient to account for the reduced culpability of
people with intellectual disability and juveniles, and the same rationale applies
to people with severe mental illness. The Supreme Court in Atkins found that
mitigation was not sufficient protection for people with intellectual disability
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See, e.g., Kleypas, 382 P.3d at 447 (“We also note the protections already in place, which protect the
incompetent from trial and the ‘insane’ from execution.”).
See, e.g., Jackson v. Indiana 406 U.S. 715, 719 (1972) (noting that the trial court found the defendant
incompetent to stand trial and “ordered him committed to the Indiana Department of Mental Health
until such time as that Department should certify to the court that ‘the defendant is sane.’”).
See Natalie Jacewicz, With No Insanity Defense, Seriously Ill People End Up In Prison , NPR (Aug.
5, 2016, 10:06 AM), https://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2016/08/05/487909967/with-noinsanity-defense-seriously-ill-people-end-up-in-prison (listing Idaho, Kansas, Montana, and Utah as
the four states without an insanity defense).
See Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 410 (1986) (“The Eighth Amendment prohibits the State
from inflicting the penalty of death upon a prisoner who is insane.”).
See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 568 (2005) (citing Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978)).
(“In any capital case a defendant has wide latitude to raise as a mitigating factor ‘any aspect of [his or
her] character or record and any of the circumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers as a
basis for a sentence less than death.”). See also State v. Kleypas, 382 P.3d. 373, 447 (Kan. 2016)
(“Finally, as Kleypas did here, mental illness can be asserted as a mitigator. While we recognize a
distinction between disqualification and mitigation, we also recognize that presenting mental illness
as a mitigatory allows the jury to consider culpability.”).
Kleypas, 382 P.3d. at 447.
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because the condition inhibits fair consideration in sentencing.175 The Court
explained that the impairments of people with intellectual disability are
relevant not only because they reduce culpability, but because these
“impairments can jeopardize the reliability and fairness of capital proceedings
against [them].”176 The Court also noted that people with intellectual disability
“may be less able to give meaningful assistance to their counsel and are
typically poor witnesses, and their demeanor may create an unwarranted
impression of lack of remorse for their crimes.”177 The same concerns are
present for people with severe mental illness, who by the definition supplied
by ABA Recommendation 122A often have “delusions (fixed, clearly false
beliefs), hallucinations (clearly erroneous perceptions of reality), extremely
disorganized thinking, or very significant disruption of consciousness, memory
and perception of the environment.”178 These impairments, if present, would
inhibit a defendant’s ability to assist in their own case. The concern may be
mitigated somewhat by medication, but medication creates its own series
problems due to difficult side effects which may make it more likely that a
defendant has an unwarranted impression of lack of remorse for their
crimes.179
The Roper Court similarly found that the reduction in culpability of
juveniles was not sufficiently protected by mitigation. The Court explained,
“An unacceptable likelihood exists that the brutality or cold-blooded nature of
any particular crime would overpower mitigating arguments based on youth as
a matter of course, even where the juvenile offender’s objective immaturity,
vulnerability, and lack of true depravity should require a sentence less severe
than death.”180 The same rationale applies for people with severe mental
illness. A capital case will always involve a heinous crime that often overpowers
the mitigating factor of a defendant’s severe mental illness despite that
defendant’s reduced culpability. The Supreme Court’s determinations in
Atkins and Roper that mitigation was not sufficient protection for people with
intellectual disability and juveniles thus makes any claim that it is sufficient
protection for people with severe mental illness highly questionable.
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See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 321 (finding that “reliance on mental retardation as a mitigating factor can be
a two-edged sword that may enhance the likelihood that the aggravating factor of future dangerousness
will be found by the jury.”).
Id. at 306–07.
Id. at 320–21.
ABA Recommendation 122A, at 7.
See, What are possible side effects of antipsychotics? NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF MENTAL HEALTH,
https://www.nimh.nih.gov/health/topics/mental-health-medications/index.shtml#part_149866 (listing
the possible uncomfortable and painful side effects of antipsychotic medication).
Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 573 (2005).
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B. Diagnoses Should Not Be Used for Legal Determinations
The second major objection to a categorical prohibition for people with
severe mental illness argues that diagnoses should not be used for legal
determinations. This position was taken on the issue by Dr. Douglas Mossman
shortly following Atkins. 181 Mossman points out that the American Psychiatric
Association’s diagnostic manual includes a “Cautionary Statement” that “The
clinical and scientific considerations involved in categorization of these
conditions as mental disorders may not be wholly relevant to legal judgments,
for example, that take into account such issues as individual responsibility.”182
Mossman also cites the work of Professor Stephen Morse, who has “long
believed that psychiatric diagnoses should play little or no role in legal
proceedings.”183 Morse has argued that “the decision whether someone’s
capacity for rationality is sufficient to hold him responsible ultimately is ‘a
common sense inference,’ so that ‘the final judgment must be about the
specific individual who is the potential subject of special mental health law
treatment.’”184 If the ultimate determination of reduced capacity for rationality,
or culpability, should focus only on the specific individual, then a categorical
determination based on diagnoses would not be proper. Though this is a
strong objection, it can be answered in two ways.
First, the Supreme Court made the diagnosis of intellectual disability
sufficient for a death penalty exemption under Atkins.185 In recent cases
interpreting Atkins, the Court has in fact relied more heavily on clinical
definitions to determine which defendants qualify for an exemption under
Atkins.186 Relying on a diagnosis is thus permissible, and for Atkins cases
required, under Supreme Court death penalty precedents creating a death
penalty exemption.
Second, the proposed prohibition for people with severe mental illness
outlined in this article does not make diagnosis sufficient for the exemption to
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See Mossman, supra note 76, at 287–89 (casting doubt on the value of psychiatric diagnoses for legal
proceedings).
Id. at 272 (arguing that the then-current edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental
Disorders [DSM-IV-TR] point to inherent limitations within the APA’s diagnostic schemes).
Id. at 287–88. See also Stephen J. Morse, Crazy Reasons, 10 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 189, 216
(1999) (arguing that diagnoses do not answer the legally relevant question of the reason for the
defendant’s behavior).
Mossman, supra note 76, at 287 (citing Stephen J. Morse, Crazy Reasons, 10 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL
ISSUES 189, 219 (1999)).
See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 321 (concluding that “death is not a suitable punishment for a mentally
retarded criminal” because it violates the Eighth Amendment prohibition of cruel and unusual
punishment).
See Part III(A), supra (explaining the increasing and continual reliance of the Supreme Court on
clinical definitions for interpreting Atkins).
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apply. ABA Recommendation 122A acknowledges that diagnosis alone
should not be a basis for an exemption because of the heterogeneity of
symptoms found in people with mental illness.187 The Recommendation
therefore proposes a requirement of a qualifying diagnosis and a
determination that impairment from the disease be “significant.” 188 This was
done to ensure that the defendant’s culpability was sufficiently lessened due to
his or her condition, as for defendants with intellectual disability.189 If
implemented, this significant impairment requirement would allow
individualized consideration of the defendant’s culpability and would not rely
entirely on diagnoses.
C. Combating Stigma Should Require Treating People With Mental Illness
As Fully Capable Agents
In creating a new death penalty prohibition, legislatures or courts should
consider the impact it may have on stigma and discrimination against people
with severe mental illness. Mental health professionals have worked for a long
time to “reduce the discrimination and stigma associated with having a mental
disorder.”190 Creating a rule that recognizes the reduction of culpability for
people with severe mental illness may imply that they are not fully capable
agents.191 It might therefore increase stigma and discrimination, which is a
heavy price to pay for an already stigmatized group. This concern, though
highly important, can be answered in three ways.
First, the Supreme Court has not discussed combating stigma and
discrimination in creating death penalty prohibitions. The Atkins Court did
not mention the decision’s potential impact on stigma or discrimination for
people with intellectual disability.192 Nor did the Roper Court address the issue
for juveniles.193 Concerns about stigma and discrimination have thus not been
present in Supreme Court cases on death penalty exemptions and may not
have to be considered for the creation of a new exemption. This may be
implicit support by the Court for the idea that death penalty exemptions do
not meaningfully increase stigma or discrimination.
Second, the proposal discussed in this article and supported by mental
health professional organizations does not solely rely on category
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ABA Recommendation 122A at 7.

Id.
Id.
Mossman, supra note 76 at 272.
See id. at 273 (criticizing the Atkins decision because “it says explicitly that all persons diagnosed with
mental retardation necessarily lack the capacity to accept full moral responsibility for their actions.”).
See generally Atkins, 536 U.S. 304.
See generally Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
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determinations but also includes a “significant impairment” requirement.194
Implementation of the proposal would thus not imply that all people with
severe mental illness are significantly impaired or anything less than fully
capable agents. It would be a narrowly tailored exemption that ensures that a
defendant meeting its conditions actually have impairments significant enough
to reduce culpability.
Third, death is different. Imposition of the death penalty is so final and
serious that it can only be imposed on “the worst of the worst.”195 The proposal
would still allow people with severe mental illness not found to be “insane” to
be fully prosecuted and subject to harsh penalties including life imprisonment
for serious crimes. Prohibition of the death penalty may thus only marginally
impact stigma and discrimination.
VIII. CONCLUSION
People who had severe mental illness at the time of their crime and
significant impairment due to their illness should not be eligible for the death
penalty. Creating such a prohibition would prevent a significant number of
executions.196 It should be created because people with severe mental illness
and significant impairment from their illness have sufficiently reduced
culpability. A fruitful approach to creating such a prohibition is to rely on
medical professionals to define the category of people with “severe mental
illness.” This approach is supported by Atkins and recent Supreme Court
cases interpreting Atkins. The success of this approach in the preliminary
analysis of Kleypas, particularly the court’s reliance on ABA
Recommendation 122A, demonstrates how it may be successful in the future.
Objections to this approach can be addressed by the inclusion of a “significant
impairment” requirement. A new prohibition on the execution of people with
severe mental illness who were significantly impaired at the time of their crime
should be created either judicially or legislatively.
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Kansas v. Marsh, 548 U.S. 163, 206 (2006) (Souter, J. dissenting).
See, e.g., Mentally Ill Prisoners Who Were Executed , DEATH PENALTY INFORMATION CENTER,
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